

## Community resources

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*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 07CAIRO974, XXXXXXXXXXXX MP ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#07CAIRO974**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">07CAIRO974</a>	2007-04-04 17:17	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	<a href="#">Embassy Cairo</a>

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9135>  
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9164>  
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RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000974

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NSC FOR WATERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2047

TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM EG

SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX MP ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

REF: A. 2006 CAIRO 4612

B. 2006 CAIRO 6600

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs,  
William R. Stewart, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting with poloff, XXXXXXXXXXXX parliamentarian XXXXXXXXXXXX discussed presidential son Gamal Mubarak's possible succession of his father, and opined that Gamal increasingly views Minister of Defense Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and EGIS head Omar Suleiman as a threat to his presidential ambitions. XXXXXXXXXXXX alleged that Tantawi recently told him, in confidence, of his deepening frustration with Gamal. End summary.

GAMAL ANGLING TO "GET RID" OF HIS COMPETITION

¶2. (S) On March 29, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted to poloff his assessment that the recently approved constitutional amendments package is largely aimed at ensuring Gamal Mubarak's succession of his father, and "a more controllable, stable political scene when he does take the reins." Opining that "Gamal and his clique" are becoming more confident in the inevitability of Gamal's succession, and are now angling to remove potential "stumbling blocks," XXXXXXXXXXXX said that speculation among Cairo's elite is that there could be a cabinet reshuffle as soon as May or June, in which Minister of Defense Tantawi and/or EGIS head Omar Suleiman would be replaced. "Those two are increasingly viewed as a threat by Gamal and those around him," and thus Gamal is reportedly pushing Mubarak to get them out of the way, so they "could not pose any problems" in the event of a succession. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that "hitches" to a Gamal succession could occur if Mubarak died before installing his son: "Gamal knows this, and so wants to stack the deck in his favor as much as possible now, while Mubarak is firmly in control, just in case his father drops dead sooner rather than later."

¶3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX had commented to him in a recent private meeting that, "he has had it 'up to here' with Gamal and his cronies, and the tremendous corruption they are facilitating." XXXXXXXXXXXX told me he is having trouble sleeping at night," he continued, "and that he cannot stand what has happened to the country, and what may yet happen to the country." Disappointed by the recent constitutional amendments, and skeptical about the will of either Mubarak or Gamal to push forward meaningful political reforms, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he viewed a post-Mubarak military coup as "the best possible way out for Egypt ... we are in a terrible spot, and that is the best of all the bad options available." (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX provided no further details about a possible coup scenario, and appeared to simply be theorizing about the future. To date, we have not heard other interlocutors speculate about a possible coup option. End note).

CURRENT GOSSIP IN PARLIAMENT

¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that parliamentarians are abuzz over rumors that, under newly amended constitutional Article 136 (which now gives the president the ability to dissolve the People's Assembly by executive decree alone, without a national referendum), the People's Assembly will be dissolved in roughly a year, so as to rid it of the "troublesome" 88 Muslim Brotherhood MP's. New elections would then be held, but "as under the new constitutional amendments, there will be no direct judicial supervision of elections to help to guard against fraud, the government can be expected to engineer the results" so that there are far fewer MB MP's in the new parliament. "The government is happy to deal with fairly tame and non-threatening oppositionists such as XXXXXXXXXXXX, Wafd, and Tagammu. But they do not want such a powerful bloc of MB MP's to remain, particularly when they would make the most noise in the event of a Gamal succession."

¶5. (C) In terms of his personal political aspirations, XXXXXXXXXXXX told poloff he has XXXXXXXXXXXX the XXXXXXXXXXXX, founded by XXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXX

¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that hisXXXXXXXXXX (per ref B, a XXXXXXXXXXXX), is XXXXXXXXXXXX at the XXXXXXXXXXXX, due to what XXXXXXXXXXXX termed the continuing XXXXXXXXXXXX. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, MinDef Tantawi called him XXXXXXXXXXXX to ensure that XXXXXXXXXXXX was satisfied as to how XXXXXXXXXXXX was being XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he engaged XXXXXXXXXXXX with XXXXXXXXXXXX, asking him to help get XXXXXXXXXXXX, as he has already XXXXXXXXXXXX, then replied that XXXXXXXXXXXX cannot be XXXXXXXXXXXX before he XXXXXXXXXXXX, as, "we are under terrible foreign pressure to XXXXXXXXXXXX, so cannot XXXXXXXXXXXX, as they will then criticize us for not XXXXXXXXXXXX too." XXXXXXXXXXXX subsequent suggestion to XXXXXXXXXXXX both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX went unheeded. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly told XXXXXXXXXXXX that he had instructed XXXXXXXXXXXX to not undertake any procedures to divest XXXXXXXXXXXX of his XXXXXXXXXXXX; XXXXXXXXXXXX therefore believes XXXXXXXXXXXX will be able to re-assume XXXXXXXXXXXX

¶7. (S) Comment: While XXXXXXXXXXXX is a useful interlocutor and a well-placed parliamentarian, we stress that he is the only Embassy contact to date who has raised with us the spectre of a post-Mubarak military coup. While discussion of presidential succession is a favorite parlor game in Cairo salons, hypothesizing about the acutely sensitive topic of a coup is certainly not regularly undertaken in Egyptian circles.

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